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INTERPRETING THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S CITIZEN SUIT
PROVISION: SUCCESSOR LANDOWNER LIABILITY FOR
INACTIVE MINE DISCHARGES IN SIERRA CLUB v.
EL PASO GOLD MINES, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The surface water resources of the United States are vast, com-
prising 3.5 million miles of rivers and streams.1 These abundant
resources have contributed significantly toward building and main-
taining a healthy society and economy, as surface waters provide
drinking water for approximately one-half of the nation's popula-
tion. 2 Commercially, more than nine trillion gallons of water are
used annually to manufacture goods and process food.3 The indus-
trialization and urbanization of the nineteenth century, however,
produced adverse effects in the form of untreated or inadequately
treated municipal waste discharges, precipitating a crisis in the
quality of our nation's waters. 4 The historical absence of environ-
mental regulation during the early period of American industriali-
zation left a legacy of contaminated properties. 5
As of 2005, both active and inactive mines were still considered
significant contributors to the water pollution problems in the
United States. 6 Specifically, drainage from inactive or abandoned
1. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REv. 537, 552 (2004) (discussing abundance of United States
water resources).
2. See Office of Water, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Liquid Assets: A
Summertime Perspective on the Importance of Clean Water to the Nation's Economy, EPA
No. 800R96002, at 10 (May 1996) (explaining allocation and use of America's
water resources).
3. See id. (noting volume of water used for commercial purposes).
4. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States-State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145,
162-68 (2003) (discussing epidemics and development of municipal water treat-
ment systems in context of eighteenth and nineteenth century American industri-
alization and urbanization).
5. See Mina S. Park, Comment, Predecessor Landowner Liability: Disclosing Latent
Defects, 13 UCLAJ. ENvrL. L. & POC'Y 299, 299 (1994/1995) (explaining lack of
environmental regulation as one of several reasons for contaminated properties).
Industrial waste effluents, which continued to grow in magnitude as U.S. manufac-
turing strengthened, exceeded municipal sewage by a ratio of seven to six by the
end of World War II. See Andreen, supra note 1, at 554. By the end of the 1960s,
eighty percent of the pollution discharged into U.S. waterways was industrial in
origin. See id.
6. See River Network, Understanding the Clean Water Act-Poor Mining
Practices and Abandoned Mines, http://www.cleanwateract.org/pages/b4.cfn-
(515)
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mining areas represented a substantial portion of acid mine drain-
age, especially in the Appalachian region. 7 In western watersheds,
home to more than 550,000 abandoned mines, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that mine waste has contami-
nated at least forty percent of streams. 8 Such abandoned mine
waste, defined categorically as "acid mine drainage," occurs either
as rainwater runoff from surface mining sites or as seepage from
underground mines. 9 Regardless of the source, abandoned mine
pollution has damaged municipal water supplies and private wells,
killed or diminished aquatic life in nearby streams, and damaged
industrial equipment.10 Though courts historically have inter-
preted federal laws to hold landowners and operators of active
mines liable for drainage from mining activities, legal scholars and
judges continue to disagree whether such laws also apply to succes-
sor landowners of inactive or abandoned mines."
(last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (explaining effect of mines on water pollution
problem).
7. See Michael D. Bryan, Note, Toward Strict Liability for Abandoned Mine Drain-
age, 71 Ky. L.J. 193, 193 (1983) (noting effects of acid mine drainage in eastern
United States). As an example, the single biggest water pollution problem in
Pennsylvania is polluted water draining from abandoned coal mining operations.
See Walter Rossman et al., Abandoned Mines-Pennsylvania's Single Biggest Water Pollu-
tion Problem (Jan. 21, 1997), http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/DEPUTATE/
MINRES/BAMR/MINING_012397.htm (detailing Pennsylvania's efforts to fight
acid mine drainage through multi-year funding plan and long-term reclamation
management plan). Over half of the waterways that do not meet water quality
standards-more than 2,400 miles-fail to do so because of mine drainage. See id.
8. See EARTHWORKS, Cleaning Up Abandoned Mines, http://www.earthwork
saction.org/aml.cfm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (explaining effect of pollution
from abandoned mines in western states).
9. See Bryan, supra note 7, at 194 (discussing sources of mine pollution). Acid
mine drainage is the general term for sulfuric acid, formed by the oxidation of
pyrite (a sulfide of iron) when coal from a mine is exposed to water and oxygen.
See id. Upon the occurrence of this chemical reaction, iron hydroxides, additional
contributors to the water pollution problem, are created. See id. Once the acid
mine drainage composed of sulfuric acid and iron hydroxides-as well as possible
amounts of aluminum, copper, zinc, magnesium and manganese-reaches a water
source, the relatively insoluble iron precipitates and forms the compound referred
to as "yellow buoy." See id.
10. See id. at 195 (describing magnitude of harms resulting from acid mine
drainage).
11. See id. at 196-203 (detailing historical evolution of common law and statu-
tory law in context of liability for acid mine drainage). Historically, courts used the
federal common law tort theory of nuisance as a remedy for mine drainage, espe-
cially in cases involving interstate pollution. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (holding Georgia had right to prevent copper companies
from discharging noxious gases under public nuisance theory); Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906) (holding state of Illinois not liable under public nuisance
theory for discharges of sewage into river). In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Title 30 United States
Code 1201-1328, to control the surface mining of coal and the surface effects of
2
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In Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. (El Paso) ,12 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals became the highest federal court to ad-
dress liability for abandoned mine pollution of waterways, specifi-
cally in the context of successor landowner liability. 13 El Paso
highlights the difficulties that federal courts face in assessing viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), 14 especially with re-
gard to judicial attempts to reconcile divergent interpretations of
the United States Supreme Court's 1987 ruling in Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. (Gwaltney),15 Gwaltney
attempted to define the circumstances constituting a violation
within the boundaries of a valid CWA citizen suit.16 Veering from
the line of reasoning followed by three other federal courts of ap-
peal, the Tenth Circuit implicitly supported the view that a continu-
ing migration of pollutants from a single past discharge is a
violation as defined by the CWA. 17 Though the Tenth Circuit fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's guidance and interpreted the CWA to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint in El Paso, the
court held that triable issues of fact existed regarding the plaintiffs'
good-faith allegation of CWA violations based on the amount of
credible evidence cited by both parties.18
This Note examines the Tenth Circuit's statutory interpreta-
tion of two components of the CWA's citizen suit provision: the "al-
leged to be in violation of' and "discharge of a pollutant"
components. 19 Section II of this Note provides a brief summary of
underground coal mining to "assure that surface mining operations are so con-
ducted as to protect the environment." See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2000). Under the
SMCRA, the person conducting active mining activities is required to control
drainage from mining activities, and thus, the SMCRA would not apply to a mere
purchaser of an abandoned coal mine site. See Bryan, supra note 7, at 203. Yet, the
Clean Water Act, which prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into navigable
waters without a permit, has been interpreted broadly to include all drainage from
mining activities as a discharge to be regulated, regardless of the present land-
owner's activities on the land. See id. at 205.
12. 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005).
13. See id. at 1143-44 (presenting court's analysis of whether mere ownership
of point source triggers liability).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000) [hereinafter CWA].
15. 484 U.S. 49 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989).
16. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139-40 (detailingjudicial divergence of opinion in
interpreting violation of CWA since Gwaltney).
17. See id. at 1140-41 (distinguishing instant case from those involving migra-
tion of pollutants from prior discharges based on fact that man-made point source
is present).
18. See id. at 1150 (holding magistrate erred in granting summary judgment
for plaintiffs).
19. See Randall S. Abate, Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal En-
vironmental Laws: Recommendations for the Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney Stan-
20061
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the facts in El Paso.20 Section III explains the historical evolution of
federal water quality laws, discusses relevant case law surrounding
the jurisdictional authority underlying the CWA citizen suit provi-
sion for pollution violations, and clarifies the guidelines courts
must follow when interpreting statutory language and ruling on
motions for summary judgment. 21 Section IV discusses the El Paso
court's analysis of relevant statutory language and case law. 22 Sec-
tion V analyzes the propriety of the Tenth Circuit's determina-
tion.23 Finally, Section VI of this Note evaluates the impact of the El
Paso decision on future determinations of judicial jurisdiction
under the CWA's citizen suit provision. 24
II. FACTS
In El Paso, the Sierra Club and the Mineral Policy Center (col-
lectively Sierra Club), plaintiff environmental groups, alleged that
the El Paso Mine, an inactive gold mine, discharged pollutants into
Colorado's Cripple Creek.25 The mine, located on one-hundred
acres of El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. (El Paso) property between Crip-
ple Creek and Victor, Colorado, was never in operation during El
Paso's ownership of the property.26 An abandoned vertical elevator
shaft (the El Paso Shaft) connected the mine to the six-mile-long
Roosevelt Tunnel, a mine drainage tunnel constructed in 1910 to
drain groundwater from mines in the Cripple Creek Mining Dis-
trict.27 The Roosevelt Tunnel Portal, the physical termination of
dard, 16 TEMP. ENvrL. L. & TEcH. J. 1, 5 (1997) (explaining that "alleged to be in
violation" and "ongoing violation" are, historically, terms of judicial interpretative
disagreement).
20. For a discussion of the facts in El Paso, see infra notes 25-43 and accompa-
nying text.
21. For a discussion of the CWA and relevant statutory and judicial back-
ground of section 402 (33 U.S.C. § 1342), see infra notes 44-126 and accompany-
ing text.
22. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in El Paso, see infra notes 127-59
and accompanying text.
23. For a critique of the El Paso decision, see infra notes 160-84 and accompa-
nying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the El Paso decision on federal jurisdic-
tion, see infra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
25. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (10th Cir.
2005) (discussing plaintiffs' argument in favor of liability for pollution).
26. See id. at 1136 (explaining El Paso's past, present and future use of land
on which El Paso Mine was located).
27. See id. (describing physical connection of El Paso Mine to navigable
waters).
4
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the mining district's tunnel system, discharged water into Cripple
Creek, which ultimately emptied into the Arkansas River. 28
In 2001, the plaintiffs filed a citizen suit under the CWA in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 29 The law-
suit alleged that El Paso violated CWA section 402 by discharging
pollutants into Cripple Creek without a valid federal permit.30
Water samples taken from the El Paso Shaft and the Roosevelt Tun-
nel showed varying, but similar, amounts of mineral pollutants.31
El Paso claimed a lack of evidence linking water from the shaft to
water discharged at the portal.3 2
The district court referred the case to a magistrate who held
that the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction under CWA sec-
tion 505(a) (1). 3 3 Despite the lack of direct contribution to the al-
leged pollution through active mining operations, the magistrate
ruled that liability under the CWA is based on the ownership or
operation of a point source, not on the activity which results in the
point source discharge. 34 The magistrate further found that the ex-
perts relied upon by each party agreed that some of the water flow-
ing into the Roosevelt Tunnel from the El Paso Shaft reached the
tunnel portal and ultimately flowed into Cripple Creek.35 Having
found the necessary hydrological link, the magistrate granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs.3 6
28. See id. (explaining geographical hydrology connecting water discharges
from Roosevelt Tunnel Portal and water flowing into Arkansas River).
29. See id. (noting plaintiffs' exercise of CWA's citizen suit provision to hold El
Paso liable for pollution violations).
30. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1136 (noting plaintiffs' allegations that El Paso
discharged zinc and manganese into Cripple Creek).
31. See id. at 1137 n.2 (noting specific levels of zinc and manganese in El Paso
Shaft and Roosevelt Tunnel Portal in October 1994, November 1995 and October
2000). While the levels of zinc and manganese in water samples collected between
October 1994 and November 2000 at the Roosevelt Tunnel varied over time, the
levels of zinc and manganese from those samples were similar to such levels ob-
served at the El Paso Shaft. See id.
32. See id. at 1137 (noting El Paso's claim that hydrological connection was
not established).
33. See id. at 1136-37 (explaining magistrate's rationale for upholding jurisdic-
tion under CWA).
34. See id. at 1137 (detailing magistrate's favoring of plaintiffs' interpretation
of CWA statutory language). A point source is defined as "any discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, chan-
nel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
are or may be discharged." See 33 U.S.C § 1362(12), (14).
35. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1137 (explaining necessary hydrological link estab-
lished by expert agreement).
36. See id. (noting grant of summary judgment properly based on evidence
presented).
2006] 519
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El Paso appealed the ruling to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, citing three separate grounds on which it believed the magis-
trate's ruling was improper.37 First, El Paso argued the magistrate
erred in granting Sierra Club's summary judgment motion because
the El Paso Mine was merely a conduit for the migration of residual
effluence from a past discharge. 38 Second, El Paso proposed that a
party could not be liable for a discharge of pollutants absent some
form of affirmative conduct that resulted in the pollution. 39 Fi-
nally, El Paso asserted that, aside from the issue ofjurisdiction, the
magistrate failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party; thus, the plaintiffs had failed to proffer the facts
necessary to meet their burden in establishing a hydrological con-
nection between the El Paso Shaft and the Roosevelt Tunnel.40
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district magistrate's jurisdic-
tion to hear the case under CWA section 505 (a) (1).41 Additionally,
the court determined the magistrate correctly held that the CWA
required El Paso to apply for a federal permit.42 The court, never-
theless, reversed Sierra Club's grant of summary judgment, finding
37. See id. at 1138-39 (noting El Paso's appeal on grounds of lack ofjurisdic-
tion and lack of sufficient evidence). Concurrent with the federal appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, the Colorado Water Quality Control Division (CWQCD) filed an
administrative action against El Paso based on the same allegations set forth by the
Sierra Club. See id. at 1137. The CWQCD's case was referred to an administrative
lawjudge (ALJ) who found jurisdiction under the Colorado Water Quality Control
Act to hold El Paso liable for pollutants leeching from its inactive mine. See id. at
1138. Though the ALJ ultimately held that El Paso had discharged pollutants into
state waters, El Paso and the State of Colorado agreed to stay further administrative
proceedings until the federal court appeal was decided. See id. See also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-8-103(19) (2005) (defining "state waters"); see id. § 25-8-501 (clarifying
administration and enforcement of permit requirements for point source dis-
charges into state waters by Colorado Water Quality Control Commission).
38. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1140 (stating El Paso's argument on theory that
migration of residual contamination from prior discharges is not ongoing
violation).
39. See id. at 1142 (noting El Paso's argument on alternative theory that pas-
sive landowners cannot be held liable for mine discharges).
40. See id. at 1149-50 (describing El Paso's third argument that experts dis-
agreed regarding whether pollutants from shaft were discharged at portal).
41. See id. at 1141 (affirming magistrate's ruling on jurisdictional issue). The
Tenth Circuit initially ordered the parties to submit briefs on additional issues (the
status of the CWQCD proceeding and the desirability of a stay of appeal pending
state administrative action decision) to determine the appropriateness of federal
appellate review. See id. at 1138. Though the Tenth Circuit abated the case under
the rationale that the CWA "manifests a 'pro-federalism thrust"' giving states the
primary role in CWA administration and enforcement, the court lifted its stay due
to the length of time the defendant's appeal was pending review. See id.
42. See id. at 1146 (affirming magistrate's ruling on issue of NPDES applicabil-
ity to passive landowners).
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that triable issues of material fact existed concerning the flow of
water from the El Paso Shaft to the Roosevelt Tunnel.43
III. BACKGROUND
A. State Water Control Policies and Enactment of the CWA
Prior to the 1970s, individual states were largely responsible for
enacting water pollution control legislation in response to a federal
government mandate to enforce water quality standards. 44 This
mandate was set forth in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948 (FWPCA) 45 which provided state and local governments with
federal technical assistance and research funds.46 Federal involve-
ment in the enforcement of pollution control, however, was limited
to matters involving interstate waters, provided that government
consent had been given by the state in which the pollution
originated. 47 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Congress enacted a
series of amendments to the FWPCA that accomplished the follow-
ing objectives: (1) extending federal assistance to state and local
enforcement programs; (2) expanding federal jurisdiction and re-
sponsibility over pollution enforcement to include navigable inter-
state and intrastate waters; and (3) establishing initial water quality
standards that would determine actual pollution levels and control
requirements. 48
Growing public awareness and heightened concern for con-
trolling water pollution and its dangerous effects, public desire for
a more prominent federal role in water pollution control programs,
and mounting frustration over the slow pace of pollution cleanup
efforts under then-existing local regulations, state regulations and
the FWPCA (and its related amendments) ultimately led to the en-
43. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1149-50 (reversing magistrate's ruling on summary
judgment motion).
44. See Stephanie L. Hersperger, Comment, A Point Source of Pollution Under the
Clean Water Act: A Human Being Should be Included, 5 DicK. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 97,
99-100 (1996) (explaining evolution of water pollution legislation).
45. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat.
1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387) [hereinafter
FWPCA].
46. See Claudia Copeland, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Divi-
sion, Clean Water Act: A Summary of the Law, U.S. Congressional Research Service
Report RL30030, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/in-
fousa/laws/majorlaw/cwa.pdf (detailing early development of comprehensive fed-
eral involvement in state and local water pollution control).
47. See id. (noting limits of federal authority in controlling specific instances
of pollution).
48. See id. (explaining how amendments in 1950s and 1960s gradually shaped
federal authority over pollution control programs).
20061
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actment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972. 49 The 1972 amendments created an extensive statute
which spelled out optimistic and ambitious programs for national
water quality improvement.50 After congressional fine-tuning by
means of further amendments in 1977, the 1972 legislation became
known comprehensively, and more popularly, as the Clean Water
Act. 51 The CWA officially affirmed Congress's intention "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
[n]ation's waters."52
At the center of the federal system for water pollution control
is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),53
a permit program under which discharges must meet specified "'ef-
fluent limitations' based on nationally uniform, technologically-
based performance standards for categories of processes. '54 By es-
tablishing a national monitoring system and the NPDES permit pro-
gram, Congress sought to reduce and control pollution discharges
through a centralized, federally-mandated permit scheme.55 Con-
gressional mechanisms for accomplishing these objectives include
the regulation of all point source discharges, authorization of
grants for the construction of publicly-owned sewage treatment fa-
49. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
50. See Copeland, supra note 46, at 2 (stressing that 1972 amendments made
fundamental revisions to FWPCA).
51. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act, http://
www.epa.gov/region5/water/cwa.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
EPA] (explaining motive behind CWA enactment).
52. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (stating congressional declaration of goals and
policy under CWA). Subsequent enactments in 1981 (streamlining the municipal
construction grant process and improving treatment plant capabilities) and 1987
(replacing the construction grant program with a new funding strategy based on
EPA-state partnerships) modified original CWA provisions. See EPA, supra note 51
(explaining intent behind CWA enactment and briefly describing CWA's statutory
structure).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. CWA section 402 allows the EPA Administrator to issue
permits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified condi-
tions. See id. § 1342(a)(1)-(5).
54. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Water Quality Policy and The Park City Princi-
ples, 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 329, 330-31 (1996) (noting stringent limitations for
issuance of NPDES permits). The term "effluent limitation" has several meanings
within the context of a CWA citizen suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Generally, how-
ever, the term refers to alternative control strategies and discharge limits estab-
lished for specific point sources that are expected to "contribute to the attainment
or maintenance" of water quality resulting from pollutant discharges that endan-
ger the protection public water supplies or the growth of a balanced population of
shellfish, fish and wildlife. See id. § 1312(a).
55. See id. (explaining overall CWA objective); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (stat-
ing congressional declaration of purpose for grants under CWA).
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cilities, and collaboration with individual states to manage
nonpoint source pollution.56
To ensure compliance with NPDES requirements, Congress
granted citizens the authority to enforce NPDES permit provisions
under CWA section 505. 5 7 Courts have consistently disagreed, how-
ever, over the nature and scope of judicial enforcement authority
under this "citizen suit provision." 58 Though the citizen suit provi-
sion parallels the language of several other federal environmental
statutes, a judicial split exists regarding the interpretation of the
statute's "alleged to be in violation" component. 59 In 1987, the
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify whether the
CWA confers subject matter jurisdiction for citizen suits seeking re-
covery for wholly past violations of the Act.60 Yet, even after Su-
56. See MacDonnell, supra note 54, at 330 (noting three basic mechanisms to
accomplish congressional objectives under CWA); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (ex-
plaining plans for waste treatment management). Though the primary focus of
the CWA is on the regulation of point source pollution, the CWA also mentions
the policy objective of developing and implementing controls for nonpoint source
pollution. See id. § 1251(a) (7). Historically, the definitions attributed to the term
"nonpoint source pollution," among many others, have included "pollution from
diffuse sources," "polluted runoff from rain or snow," and "poison runoff." See
River Network, Understanding the Clean Water Act-Point Source Discharge Per-
mits/NPDES, http://www.cleanwateract.org/pages/c3.cfm (last visited Oct. 25,
2005). The most accurate and complete definition, however, is deemed to be "any
source of pollution that is not a point source." See id. For a definition of point
source under the CWA, see supra note 34.
57. See Abate, supra note 19, at 3 (noting congressional purpose behind citi-
zen suit provision); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (listing conditions authorizing CWA citizen
suits).
58. See id. at 4 (explaining additional procedural requirements for CWA citi-
zen suits).
59. See id. (citing similarities to citizen suit provisions instituted by other fed-
eral environmental statutes). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000) (noting provision for
citizen suits under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); id. § 9659 (2000)
(noting provision for citizen suits under Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act). Under section 505(a) (1) of the CWA, any citi-
zen may institute a civil action on his own behalf in the following circumstances:
(1) against any person (including the United States and any other governmental
agency) who is alleged to be in violation of (a) an effluent standard or limitation
under the CWA or (b) an order issued by the NPDES Administrator or a State with
respect to an effluent standard or limitation; and (2) against the NPDES Adminis-
trator where there is an alleged failure of the Administrator to perform a nondis-
cretionary act or duty under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
60. See Abate, supra note 19, at 6 (noting basis for Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Gwaltney). See generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (interpreting "to be in violation"). According to
the Supreme Court, which followed the Eastern District of Virginia Court's analy-
sis, "[t]he words 'to be in violation' may reasonably be read as comprehending
unlawful conduct that occurred solely prior to the filing of the lawsuit as well as
unlawful conduct that continues into the present." See id. at 55. "Wholly past viola-
tions," therefore, are alleged violations for discharges that are not continuing at
the time a lawsuit is filed. See id.
2006] 523
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preme Court review, the circumstances under which a CWA
violation is "continuous or intermittent" remained unclear.61
The CWA, the culmination of a twenty-four year legislative pro-
cess, was the first comprehensive legislation to make water quality
protection a national objective achieved through a universally-de-
signed, federally-supervised program. 62 Though the CWA created a
planning process to address diffused, nonpoint sources of water
pollution, the CWA's primary focus with respect to NPDES is the
regulation of point sources. 63 Traditionally, courts broadly inter-
preted the definition of a point source to achieve CWA objectives,
resulting in judicial decisions declaring that sources such as aban-
doned mines are point sources under the purview of the CWA.64
B. CWA Citizen Suit Provision and Gwaltney
CWA section 505(a) (1) grants citizens the right to bring civil
actions against any individual "alleged to be in violation of' effluent
standards or limitations. 65 Considerable debate has emerged re-
garding the circumstances under which a person is "in violation of'
effluent standards, particularly with respect to whether the person
must be actively engaged in a polluting activity or whether viola-
tions can be supported by past practices that have ceased by the
time of suit.66 The United States Supreme Court attempted to clar-
61. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir.
2005) (noting issues raised by Gwaltney remained unresolved). Although it is now
clear that citizen suits cannot be premised on violations that occurred entirely in
the past, the "continuous or intermittent" issue establishes whether a discharge is
alleged to violate the CWA because of its past violation-causing conduct or its pre-
sent violation-causing effects. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
62. See MacDonnell, supra note 54, at 329 (noting historical importance of
comprehensive legislation under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972).
63. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (explaining federal planning process to identify
nonpoint sources of pollution); see also id. § 1362(12), (14) (defining "discharge of
a pollutant" and "point source"). For a definition of "point source," see supra note
34.
64. See Hersperger, supra note 44, at 102 (listing sources of water pollution
labeled by courts as potential point sources); Commonwealth v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991,
993 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting issue timing and scope of regulation). In this case, the
Administrator, under the authority of CWA section 306, enacted a regulation ad-
ding coal mining as a new source category. See id. The petitioners did not call
upon the Third Circuit to decide whether abandoned mines could be classified as
point sources. See id. Rather, the issue was the timing and scope of the regulation.
See id.
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (noting authorization for citizen suits). Under
section 301(a), "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful"
unless otherwise stated. See id. § 1311(a).
66. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139 (explaining Supreme Court's attempt in
Gwaltney to resolve confusion over when person "is in violation of" CWA).
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ify this confusion in Gwaltney, where the Court held that Congress
did not intend to permit citizen suits based on "wholly past viola-
tions."67 To establish jurisdiction, citizens must make a good-faith
allegation of continuous or intermittent violations. 68 The Court,
however, neglected to further define when a CWA violation is con-
sidered "continuous or intermittent," causing problems for lower
courts deciding cases where the conduct giving rise to the alleged
violation ceased but the effects continued. 69
More recently, courts have attempted to apply the principles of
Gwaltney to citizen suits arising under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) ,70 the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 71 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EP-
CRA) .72 The inability of courts to reach a consistent terminological
understanding of "past violations," however, has caused courts to
expand, contract and distort the Gwaltney standard, both within and
outside the CWA context.73
1. Expansive Interpretation of Gwaltney and the CWA
Courts that interpret the CWA and Gwaltney holding expan-
sively have held that the continuing migration of pollutants from a
past discharge is sufficient to establish jurisdiction.7 4 Two United
States District Courts-the District of Minnesota and the District of
Oregon-have agreed with such an interpretation of Gwaltney.75
67. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56-
60 (1987) (explaining harm sought to be addressed by citizen suit must lie in pre-
sent or future, not in past). The Gwaltney court held that the most natural reading
of section 505(a) (1) required "citizen-plaintiffs [to] allege a state of either contin-
uous or intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter
will continue to pollute in the future." See id. at 57.
68. See id. at 64 (noting jurisdictional requirement of good-faith allegation).
69. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139 (explaining difficulty of assessing liability in
cases where conduct giving rise to violation has ceased, but effects continue).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000) [hereinafter RCRA].
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000) [hereinafter CERCLA].
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000) [hereinafter EPCRA].
73. See Abate, supra note 19, at 2 (noting judicial application of Gwaltney to
different forms of federal legislation). For a discussion of how courts have di-
verged in applying the Gwaltney holding, see infra notes 74-106 and accompanying
text.
74. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139 (noting cases that follow expansive reading of
Gwaltney).
75. See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated,
793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (dismissing citizen suit because defendant's al-
leged pollution activities had ceased by time of suit with no likelihood that infrac-
tions would continue); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen
Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Or. 1997) (holding pollutants from past dis-
2006]
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a. Werlein v. United States76
In Werlein v. United States (Werlein), the District Court for the
District of Minnesota, Third Division, addressed whether toxic
waste that is introduced into a waterway over a period of time con-
stitutes "ongoing pollution" that is prohibited by the CWA.77 The
controversy centered on plaintiffs' allegations that the Twin Cities
Army AxImunition Plant (TCAAP) and Trio Solvents site, not in
operation at the time of the alleged pollution, dumped contami-
nants containing trichloroethylene (TCE) into the soil that eventu-
ally produced chemical discharges which migrated into a waterway
over time. 78 Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of rainwater infiltra-
tion of the contaminated soil, the contaminants discharged into
Long Lake and Rush Lake.79 Accordingly, the class action plain-
tiffs-citizens who resided near the two sites and relied on water
supplies allegedly polluted by the sites-sought both injunctive re-
lief and monetary damages.80 In response, the past owners and op-
erators of the Trio Solvents site argued that any violations at the site
must be deemed "wholly past violations" by virtue of the fact that
they had neither owned nor operated their business at the site since
1976, fourteen years prior to the filed complaint.81
With respect to the alleged CWA violations, the court held that
where contaminants are dumped into the soil many years ago, their
gradual migration into water can constitute an ongoing violation. 82
charges which are released gradually over time by contaminated soil is ongoing
pollution). The Werlein decision was vacated only on mootness grounds after all
class claims in the litigation were settled out-of-court. See Werlein, 793 F. Supp. at
898.
76. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990).
77. See id. at 896 (noting lack of post-Gwaltney case law on issue of what consti-
tutes ongoing violation).
78. See id. (discussing substantive arguments in plaintiffs' complaints).
79. See id. (explaining hydrological connection between source of pollution
and waterway into which it emptied).
80. See id. at 890 (citing alternative statutory and common law claims of plain-
tiffs). Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief and contaminant cleanup were
brought under federal environmental statutes (CERCLA, RCRA and CWA) and
state environmental statues (the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability
Act, or MERLA, and the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, or MERA) while
claims for monetary damages and medical monitoring were brought under com-
mon law claims. See id. at 890-91.
81. See Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 896 (explaining defendant's argument that
lack of current ownership or operation precludes liability).
82. See id. at 897 (holding that classifying steady introduction of toxic waste
into waterway over time as "ongoing pollution" is consistent with CWA goals). The
court found only two possible types of contamination: (1) cases where a polluter
dumps toxic substances directly into a waterway such that "the damage is done"
and the violation is "wholly past" under Gwaltney; and (2) cases where toxic waste
12
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Because the Trio Solvents site contained toxic substances that had
not yet entered nearby waterways but were being introduced over
time, the court held it would be consistent with the CWA's focus on
preventing water pollution to classify such discharges as "ongoing
pollution" sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under
the CWA.8 3
b. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen
Foods, Inc.84
In Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc.
(Umatilla), the District Court for the District of Oregon addressed
whether the ongoing migration of pollutants to waterways via hy-
drologically connected groundwater constitutes an ongoing dis-
charge under the CWA.85 The case arose when the Umatilla
Waterquality Protective Association (UWQPA), a nonprofit corpo-
ration dedicated to protecting water quality in Oregon, alleged that
wastewater pipelines from the defendant's vegetable processing fa-
cility periodically failed, thus discharging pollutants into Pine
Creek.8 6 The UWQPA also alleged that sodium and chloride pollu-
tants from the defendant's unlined brine pond leached into the
groundwater and were discharged into Pine Creek, thus constitut-
ing an unpermitted continuing discharge.
8 7
While the court held that an unlined brine pond constitutes a
confined and discrete conveyance within the CWA's definition of a
"point source," the court left open for Ninth Circuit review the
question of whether discharges of pollutants through hydrologi-
cally-connected groundwater are subject to the NPDES permit re-
quirement. 88 The court, however, held that if the Ninth Circuit
found that discharges via hydrologically-connected groundwater do
constitute discharges subject to NPDES regulation, then the ongo-
ing residual migration of pollutants from an old brine pond
has not yet reached a waterway but is being introduced into the waterway over time
such that it constitutes "ongoing pollution." See id.
83. See id. (stating CWA's "any addition of any pollutant" language clearly ap-
plies to discharges from Trio Solvents facility).
84. 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997).
85. See id. at 1314 (presenting main issue of case).
86. See id. at 1313-14 (explaining plaintiff's first allegation of CWA violation).
87. See id. (discussing plaintiffs second claim of CWA violation).
88. See id. at 1321 (explaining reliance on Ninth Circuit rulings on related
CWA issues). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York had previously held that "chlorine residuals," when discharged into navigable
waters, are regarded as pollutants under the CWA. See Hudson River Fishermen's
Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2006]
13
Zanan: Interpreting the Clean Water Act's Citizen Suit Provision: Succes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
528 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 515
through groundwater to surface water, without an NPDES permit,
would constitute an ongoing violation of the CWA.89 The focus is
on whether the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters from
a point source, not whether the discharger continues to add pollu-
tants to the point source itself.90
2. Narrow Interpretation of Gwaltney and the CWA
Courts that interpret the CWA and Gwaltney narrowly have
held that the migration of residual contamination from prior dis-
charges does not constitute an ongoing violation.91 The Fifth, First
and Second Circuits have followed such a rationale.92
a. Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. 93
In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. (Hamker), the Fifth
Circuit dismissed a landowner's complaint because, although lin-
gering effects remained from crude petroleum that had leaked
from the company's pipeline into a creek on the landowner's prop-
erty, the discharge had ceased by the time of the lawsuit.94 The
court held that continuing residual effects resulting from a prior
discharge are not equivalent to a continuing discharge. 95 The
court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the CWA's statutory
scheme denies a private right of action where a complaint does not
allege an ongoing violation of an effluent standard, limitation or
order. 96
89. See Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1321 (discussing facts of case); see also Werlein,
746 F. Supp. at 897 (holding pollutants from past discharges which are released
gradually over time by contaminated soil is ongoing pollution).
90. See Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1322 (applying rationale from Ninth Circuit
rulings).
91. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (10th Cir.
2005) (noting cases that follow narrow reading of Gwaltney).
92. See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094
(1st Cir. 1986) (dismissing citizen suit because defendant's alleged pollution activi-
ties had ceased by time of suit with no likelihood that infractions would continue);
Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1312-13
(2d Cir. 1993) (dismissing citizen suit because accumulated lead shot in state wa-
ters could not be considered ongoing violation); Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismissing complaint against com-
pany's leaking oil pipeline because incident involved "only single past discharge
with continuing effects, not a continuing discharge").
93. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
94. See id. at 394 (discussing facts of case).
95. See id. at 397 (finding complainant's allegations insufficient for purposes
of CWA jurisdiction).
96. See id. at 394-95 (explaining substantive requirements of private right of
action under CWA citizen suit provision).
14
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b. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.9 7
In Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (Pawtuxet), a
case which involved the dumping of wastewater into offshore wa-
ters, the First Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' lawsuit because the
alleged polluter had ceased operations by the time of the lawsuit.98
The plaintiff landowners alleged that Ciba-Geigy's discharges of
process wastewater caused economic property loss by preventing
the dredging of the silted Pawtuxet River. 99 The court, however,
found that when reviewing CWA citizen suit complaints, a court
must consider the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction and
the sincerity of the defendant's assurances against future viola-
tions.100 Given that Ciba-Geigy no longer operated under its
NPDES permit due to a disposal agreement with a local municipal
treatment facility, the court found no reasonable likelihood that
the alleged infractions would continue, and the action was
dismissed. 101
c. Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms
Co.1 0 2
In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.
(Remington Arms), the Second Circuit supported the First Circuit's
view, holding that the CWA's present violation requirement would
be undermined if a violation included the decomposition of pollu-
tants. 10 3 The case arose when deposits of clay targets and lead shot
from a local skeet shooting club accumulated in the Long Island
Sound over a seventy-year period. 10 4 Remington Arms successfully
demonstrated that it did not operate the gun club at the time of the
lawsuit and that it made a "'final irrevocable decision' never to reo-
pen the [g]un [c]lub . . .at any time in the future."'10 5 Although
the court conceded that Remington Arms discharged pollutants
97. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
98. See id. at 1094 (noting basis for dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint).
99. See id. at 1090-91 (discussing facts of case). The plaintiffs in Pawtuxet filed
suit for civil penalties under the CWA as well as for damages due to violations of
Rhode Island common law. See id.
100. See id. at 1094 (citing court's concurrence with result in Hamker v. Dia-
mond Shamrock Chemical Co.).
101. See id. (explaining basis for court's dismissal of suit).
102. 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993).
103. See id. at 1313 (explaining nature of present violation requirement under
CWA).
104. See id. at 1308 (discussing facts of case).
105. See id. at 1312 (describing evidence cited by defendant).
2006]
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without a permit, the court found Remington Arms' argument per-
suasive and dismissed the suit. 10 6
C. Liability for "Discharges" Under NPDES
CWA section 301 (a) states that "the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful" unless authorized by a NPDES per-
mit in section 402 or by Secretary of the Army approval under sec-
tion 404.107 Whereas section 404 applies to permits for dredged or
fill material, section 402 involves "pollutants" generally.'0 8 To es-
tablish a violation of either section 402 or 404 under section 301 (a),
a plaintiff must satisfy a five-part test: (1) the defendant discharged
a certain material; (2) the material in question is defined as a pollu-
tant; (3) the pollutant was discharged into navigable waters; (4) the
origin of the pollutant is defined under the CWA as a point source;
and (5) the discharge was produced without a permit.10 9
The most controversial terms in the five-part test are "dis-
charged" and "from a point source.""10 The CWA defines "dis-
charge" as the "addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source.""' 1 Though courts ruling on cases arising under
violations of section 404 have found that the term "discharge" re-
quires intentional action by an individual or company, those cases
arising under section 402 have not.112 Such a divergence in inter-
106. See id. at 1312-13 (explaining propriety of summary judgment grant for
defendant).
107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (listing effluent limitations under various CWA
provisions); id. § 1342 (listing effluent limitations for pollutants generally); id.
§ 1344 (listing effluent limitations for dredged or fill material).
108. See id. §§ 1342, 1344 (listing effluent limitations for pollutants generally
and dredged or fill material); Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (de-
nying plaintiffs claim against defendant county for failure to remove built-up silt
and sediment behind dam because active conduct resulting in discharge of
dredged or fill material was lacking). EPA regulations define "dredged material"
as material that is excavated or dredged from U.S. waters and "fill material" as
material placed in U.S. waters where the material has the effect of "(i) [r]eplacing
any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) [c]hanging the
bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States." See 40 C.F.R. pt.
232.2 (2006); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(d) (1) (2006).
109. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(noting five-element requirement for dams to require NPDES permits).
110. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1142-44 (10th
Cir. 2005) (explaining dispute as to meaning of "discharge of a pollutant"); id. at
1145-46 (explaining dispute as to meaning of "point source").
111. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" under
CWA).
112. See Froebel, 217 F.3d at 939 (explaining that section 404, its underlying
regulations, and cases applying its terms require active conduct resulting in dis-
charge of dredged or fill material). But see United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (explaining that Congress established regula-
16
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pretation is evident in Froebel v. Meyer (Froebel).1 13 In Froebel, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that no administrative regulation or case law
interpreted section 404 to require a permit in the absence of active
conduct.1 14 As for "point source," the CWA defines the term as
"any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" from which
pollutants may be discharged.115 Courts appear unanimous in
holding that inactive mines are considered point sources under the
CWA.11 6
D. The Chevron Standard and Rules of Statutory Construction
Generally in all statutory construction cases, courts begin their
analysis with the language of the statute.' 17 If such statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, the court's inquiry ends; however, if the lan-
guage of the statute can be reasonably understood as having two or
more meanings, the court must look further.118 In such cases, the
court must consider the statutory provision at issue in the context
of the statute as a whole, not in isolation. 119
More specifically, an analysis of the legislative intent behind
any congressional statute enforced by an executive branch agency
tory provisions of CWA without regard to intentionality); Sierra Club v. Abston
Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding nothing in CWA re-
lieves miners from liability on basis that operators did not actually construct con-
veyances in question).
113. 217 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
114. See id. at 938-39 (explaining active conduct requirement that necessitates
section 404 permit). In Froebel, a landowner filed a citizen suit alleging violations
under sections 402 and 404 for sediment discharges caused by the removal of the
150 year-old Funk Dam. See id. at 930-32. Froebel filed the citizen suit against
Waukesha County under section 404. See id. at 931, 939. The county merely
owned the land on which the dam was located and took no part in the activities to
dismantle the dam. See id.
115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining "point source" under CWA).
116. See, e.g., Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13
F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding spillway and valve from abandoned mine
are point sources); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 764-66 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting legislative history provides no indication that Congress intended to ex-
empt contaminated discharges from inactive mines); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown
Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1172-74 (D. Mont. 1995) (noting EPA makes clear
that mines are point sources as defined under CWA).
117. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (explaining
process of statutory interpretation).
118. See id. (explaining process of statutory interpretation when language is
capable of more than one interpretation); United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664,
669 (10th Cir. 2002) (defining "ambiguous" as being capable of interpretation
with two or more meanings).
119. See United States v. Nichols, 184 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that when court interprets statutory language, it must examine language "in
context, not in isolation").
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requires a court to follow rules of statutory interpretation outlined
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chev-
ron).120 Chevron requires that when a statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to a specific issue, a court may not substitute its own
interpretation of the statute for that of the executive branch agency
charged with its administration. 121 Rather, a court must defer to
the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute, provided the
agency's reading is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.1 22 Congress imparts such administrative deference to execu-
tive agencies by explicitly delegating to them the necessary
authority to clarify specific statutory provisions through the issu-
ance of interpretive agency regulations. 123
E. Rules of Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that a party shall be
granted a motion for summary judgment if the evidence shows that
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 12 4 At the
summary judgment stage, courts provide non-moving parties the
opportunity to prove a factual controversy exists. 125 When suffi-
cient evidence exists to support a legitimate disagreement as to
whether one party must prevail as a matter of law, a court must
deny a summary judgment motion and submit the matter to the
factfinder. 126
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In El Paso, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the plaintiffs' first argu-
ment that their claim met the necessary requirements for subject
120. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
121. See id. at 843 (explaining supremacy of administrative agency interpreta-
tion over judicial interpretation).
122. See id. (explaining that only issue for Court's consideration is permissibil-
ity of agency's statutory interpretation).
123. See id. (noting Court's deference to its prior holding in Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199 (1974)). The Ruiz Court explained, "[t]he power of an administra-
tive agency to administer a congressionally created . . .program necessarily re-
quires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." See Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 231.
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that where there is "no genuine issue as
to any material fact" based on evidence presented, "the moving party is entitled to
ajudgment as a matter of law").
125. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1150 (10th Cir.
2005) (explaining standards for summary judgment).
126. See id. (describing circumstances under which court must deny summary
judgment motion).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss2/7
LIABILITY FOR INACTIVE MINE DISCHARGES
matter jurisdiction under the CWA citizen suit provision. 127 After
passing this first hurdle, the court proceeded to agree with the
plaintiffs that El Paso's activities satisfied the definition of "dis-
charge of any pollutant" under CWA section 301(a).128 Despite
finding that the plaintiffs satisfied their jurisdictional and statutory
burdens, however, the court rejected Sierra Club's third argument
that the evidence admitted established the hydrological connection
between the El Paso Mine Shaft and the Roosevelt Tunnel Portal
necessary to demonstrate the link between the discharged pollu-
tants and their addition to navigable waters.' 29 In reviewing the
summary judgment grant de novo, the court reversed the district
magistrate's ruling, holding that Sierra Club had not sufficiently sat-
isfied the heightened evidentiary burden necessary for summary
judgment.130
A. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Findings of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. 131 The court upheld the magistrate's ruling that Sierra
Club had made the "good-faith allegation of continuous or inter-
mittent violation" required under CWA section 505.132
The court's primary focus was whether a defendant must be
engaged in a polluting practice at the time legal proceedings are
initiated or whether jurisdiction exists for past pollution practices
which have stopped by the time the plaintiff files suit.133 Relying on
the Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney, the Tenth Circuit found
the language and structure of the citizen suit provision was "prima-
rily forward-looking" or preventative.' 3 4 Thus, plaintiffs need only
127, See id. at 1141 (stating plaintiffs' position regarding satisfaction of re-
quirements for jurisdiction under citizen suit provision).
128. See id. at 1136-37 (explaining plaintiffs' argument that El Paso activities
are covered by CWA's definition of discharge); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining
"discharge of a pollutant" under CWA).
129. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1146 (stating plaintiffs' position that factual un-
certainties created by experts were not material to issue of CWA liability).
130. See id. at 1149 (noting testimonial evidence and water sampling data un-
derscore complex geology and hydrology of Roosevelt Tunnel and cast doubt on
Sierra Club's claim that pollutants discharged at portal originate at El Paso Shaft).
131. See id. at 1139 (explaining court's analysis of subject matter jurisdiction
under citizen suit provision).
132. See id. at 1141 (affirming magistrate's ruling that El Paso failed to proffer
sufficient evidence to rebut plaintiffs' good-faith allegation).
133. See id. at 1139 (noting Tenth Circuit's reliance on Gwaltney).
134. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139 (citing Supreme Court's interpretation of
citizen suit provision requirements); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
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make good-faith allegations of continuous or intermittent violations
with the "likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in
the future."135 The burden then shifts to the defendant to show
that any violations have ceased and are not likely to recur.13 6
The Tenth Circuit found the facts of the instant case more
analogous to past cases involving the ongoing discharge of pollutants
from a current point source rather than the ongoing migration of
pollutants from a past point source. 137 El Paso, in fact, did not deny
the district magistrate's determination that its mine shaft was a
point source as defined by the CWA.138 Therefore, because Sierra
Club properly alleged that the contemporaneous discharge
originated from a point source (the El Paso Shaft) which flowed
through other conveyances to navigable waters, CWA jurisdiction
was established. 139 Moreover, the court determined that all cases
on which El Paso relied involved discharging activity from a point
source which had ceased at the time of suit, whereas the discharge
from the El Paso Mine Shaft was still occurring at the time of suit.1 40
The hydrology of the El Paso Shaft and Roosevelt Tunnel con-
nection further supported the Tenth Circuit's position. 141 Given
that the tunnel was originally constructed for the purpose of drain-
ing groundwater from the rock, the shaft and tunnel were operat-
ing as intended with the unintentional and unfortunate byproduct
being polluted water. 142 In addition, because the mine shaft was a
man-made point source that delivered polluted water to the tunnel,
El Paso carried the burden of proffering rebuttal evidence as to the
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (explaining effect of language and structure in
remainder of citizen suit provision in CWA section 505).
135. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57-66 (stating most natural reading of "to be in
violation" requirement).
136. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1139 (detailing each party's burden of proof and
persuasion under requirement of initial good-faith allegation).
137. See id. at 1140 (noting similarities of El Paso facts to cases involving past
identifiable discharge such as spills, accident leakages and dumping of waste rock).
138. See id. (mentioning El Paso's failure to challenge determination that its
mine shaft was point source); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining "point source" as
"any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are
or may be discharged").
139. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1140 (explaining that mine shaft itself as point
source is not reasonably contestable).
140. See id. (noting critical differences between discharges in cases cited by El
Paso and nature of El Paso Mine Shaft discharge).
141. See id. at 1141 (describing purpose of shaft and tunnel to allow pollutants
to continually flow through rock and mine workings).
142. See id. (explaining that purpose of El Paso Shaft-Roosevelt Tunnel con-
nection was to drain groundwater from rock).
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discharge of pollutants.1 43 In the absence of such evidence, the
court followed the ruling in Gwaltney and affirmed subject matter
jurisdiction. 144
B. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Findings of
NPDES Violations
The Tenth Circuit next considered El Paso's principal chal-
lenge to the district magistrate's ruling that the focus of CWA sec-
tion 301 is the ownership of a point source rather than the
discharge-causing conduct emanating from that source. 145 The
court analyzed CWA section 301 according to its component ele-
ments: (1) discharge; (2) of a pollutant; and (3) from a point
source.
1 46
With regard to "discharge," the court looked to rules of statu-
tory construction to determine whether Congress intended to sub-
ject successor owners of a point source to section 402's NPDES
requirements. 147 After analyzing the CWA's definition of "dis-
charge" and other supporting language in the statute, the court
found that, when viewed as a whole, the CWA's liability permitting
sections clearly focused "on the point of discharge, not the underly-
ing conduct that led to the discharge."1 48 The court relied on the
CWA's consistent reference to the obligations of "owners and oper-
ators" of a point source, suggesting that the Act's provisions cover
successor landowners.1 49 Furthermore, the court asserted that in-
143. See id. (noting El Paso's burden of rebuttal).
144. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141 (explaining that good-faith allegation of
NPDES violation stands in absence of evidence to contrary).
145. See id. at 1143 (explaining that focus of CWA is not on who engages in
discharging, but rather on fact of discharge).
146. See id. at 1142 (setting forth five-part test for establishing violation of
CWA section 301).
147. See id. (stating issue was not inactive status of El Paso Mine, but whether
definition of "discharge" required affirmative conduct). For a discussion of stan-
dards of statutory interpretation as enunciated in Chevron, see supra notes 120-23
and accompanying text.
148. See id. at 1143 (analyzing theoretical foundation of liability); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (e) (stating that effluent limitations established pursuant to CWA sec-
tion 302 shall be applied to all point sources of pollutant discharges).
149. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1143-44 (noting language throughout CWA refer-
ring to "owners and operators" of point sources); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (g) (2)
(providing "owner or operator" of point source may apply for modification of per-
mit requirements); id. § 1318(a) (1) (A) (stating EPA shall require "owner or opera-
tor" of point source to establish and maintain records and perform monitoring
duties).
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terpretative support from EPA regulations was more than sufficient
to bolster its reading of the CWA. 50
The Tenth Circuit chose to discount the arguments El Paso
advanced through its cited case law, particularly with regard to El
Paso's use of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Froebel.'5 The court
found the ruling in Froebel unpersuasive because the Seventh Circuit
based its holding on an interpretation of CWA section 404, not sec-
tion 402.152 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit noted that section 404
emphasized the activity giving rise to a discharge, not the ownership
of the point source which the Seventh Circuit, in the first portion of
its Froebel opinion, had interpreted section 402 to address. 153 Most
importantly, however, the court found Froebel inapplicable due to
one significant factual difference between the two cases: the dam in
Froebel was not a point source, and thus did not come under the
purview of section 402, whereas El Paso already agreed that its shaft
was a point source pursuant to the CWA.154
The Tenth Circuit deemed both CWA sections 301 (a) and 402
applicable to point source owner liability for unpermitted dis-
charges in the absence of active mining operations. 155 The court
thereby concluded that triable issues of fact existed regarding El
150. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144 (explaining that while not substitute for
CWA's plain language, EPA regulations provided interpretative support); see also
40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2 (2006) (stating that "addition of any pollutant" is defined with
references to discharges through conveyances "owned by a person"); Nonpoint
Source Management Programs Grants Guidance, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,248 (Aug. 28,
1990) (explaining drainage from abandoned mines is point source pollution
where owner can be found); 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.26(b) (4) (iii) (stating in NPDES reg-
ulation requiring permits for storm water runoff that inactive mines are mining
sites "which have an identifiable owner/operator").
151. SeeElPaso, 421 F.3d at 1145 (explaining Tenth Circuit's three-part justifi-
cation for finding holding in Froebel unpersuasive); Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928,
938 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining Seventh Circuit's ruling that definition of "dis-
charge" under section 404 strongly suggests permits are required only when party
allegedly needing one takes "some action, rather than doing nothing whatsoever
. . . . .).
152. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1145 (noting linguistic difference between section
402's focus on "discharge of a pollutant" and section 404's "discharge of dredged
or fill material"). Froebel did interpret the word "discharge," but interpreted its
meaning in the context of "dredged or fill material," not "pollutants." See Froebel,
217 F.3d at 938; see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (applying CWA to permits for
dredged or fill material).
153. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1145 (explaining second basis for distinguishing
Froebel facts from facts of El Paso).
154. See id. (explaining Froebel applied to nonpoint source of pollution
whereas source in El Paso was point source); see also Froebe, 217 F.3d at 937 (hold-
ing removed dam was not point source because term "connotes the terminal end
of an artificial system for moving water, waste, or other materials"); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (defining "point source" under CWA).
155. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1146 (stating basis for El Paso's liability).
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Paso's liability for discharges in the absence of active mining opera-
tions on its property. 156
C. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Grant of
Summary Judgment Based on Evidence
Although the Tenth Circuit found El Paso's arguments merit-
less with respect to the first two issues, the court agreed with El Paso
that genuine issues of material fact precluded granting the Sierra
Club's summary judgment motion. 157 Viewed in the proper light-
the light most favorable to the non-moving party (El Paso)-the
court concluded Sierra Club failed to establish beyond dispute the
facts necessary to show a hydrological connection between the pol-
lutants emanating from the shaft and those discharged at the por-
tal. 15 8 The court reversed the magistrate's ruling and remanded
the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with its
opinion. 1 59
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Findings of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In El Paso, the Tenth Circuit properly concluded that El Paso
failed to proffer any evidence indicating that the discharge of pollu-
tants from its shaft was not a recurring and ongoing problem. 160
The court, in assessing the precedent set by the Supreme Court in
Gwaltney, correctly followed an expansive reading of the case as en-
156. See id. (noting final issue before court).
157. See id. at 1149-50 (holding plaintiffs failed to establish evidence necessary
to show required hydrological connection). The court's reversal of the district
magistrate's ruling ultimately turned on its review of the expert testimony prof-
fered by the parties. See id. at 1146-48. The Tenth Circuit, which reviewed the
grant of summary judgment de novo, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of establishing a hydrological connection between the pollutants dis-
charged from the El Paso Mine Shaft and the water discharged from the Roosevelt
Tunnel Portal into navigable waters. See id. at 1146. The plaintiffs' experts main-
tained that "better than half" of the water conveyed from El Paso's property into
the Roosevelt Tunnel was continuously discharged into Cripple Creek. See id. at
1147. El Paso's expert, however, found it likely that a large part of the water flow-
ing from the portal was derived from water that infiltrated into the tunnel between
the El Paso Mine Shaft and the portal. See id. at 1148. As a result, the court found
that El Paso presented enough compelling evidence to withstand a motion for
summary judgment. See id. at 1149-50.
158. See id. (noting inappropriateness of magistrate's ruling in favor of sum-
mary judgment for plaintiffs).
159. See id. at 1151 (stating procedural result of Tenth Circuit's holding).
160. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141 (noting El Paso's failure to proffer evidence
to negate plaintiffs' good-faith allegation).
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dorsed by district courts in Minnesota and Oregon. 161 In light of
the facts in El Paso, the Tenth Circuit's opinion is consistent with an
expansive reading of Gwaltney rather than the narrow interpreta-
tion argued by El Paso.' 62 The court's judgment is supported by
evidence showing discharges from the mine were ongoing and not
the result of a past release with lingering effects. 163
The court conclusively established, both through a clear-cut
reading of the CWA's general definition provision and El Paso's
own admission, that El Paso's mine shaft was a point source rather
than a nonpoint source. 164 Thus, the source of the pollution falls
under the purview of CWA section 402.165 In addition, Sierra Club
alleged an ongoing discharge rather than the diffusion of pollutants
from a past discharge. 166 The only cases El Paso cited in its defense
involved identifiable discharges from point sources occurring in the
past.' 67 El Paso made no mention of cases identifying discharges
from point sources continuously occurring at the time of suit.' 68 By
differentiating the true essence of Sierra Club's allegation, the
Tenth Circuit clarified the magnitude of El Paso's burden in defeat-
161. See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1312, 1322 (D. Or. 1997) (holding ongoing migration of pollutants from old
brine pit's residues through groundwater to surface water without NPDES permit
would constitute ongoing violation of CWA); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp.
887, 897 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding waste that has not yet reached waterway but is
being introduced into waterway over time constitutes "ongoing" waterway
pollution).
162. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1140 (explaining El Paso's cited cases all involved
identifiable discharges from point sources that occurred in past).
163. See id. (characterizing nature of El Paso Mine discharge). Based on the
hydrology of the El Paso Shaft and Roosevelt Tunnel, pollutants continually flowed
through the rock and mine workings until they reached the shaft, where they were
then discharged into the tunnel. See id. at 1141. Though the origin of the dis-
charged pollutants was unknown, the mine was a man-made point source that de-
livered pollutants and continued to discharge them into the Roosevelt Tunnel,
distinguishing this case from those involving the migration of pollutants from
prior discharges. See id.
164. See id. at 1140-41 (noting agreement among parties that El Paso Mine is
point source); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining "point source" under CWA).
The court held that had the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that pollutants migrated
from surface waters through the ground to the tunnel or seeped into the tunnel
from naturally occurring mineral deposits, El Paso's argument and cited cases
would have "considerable force." See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141.
165. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141-42 (explaining that CWA section 402 applies
to case facts).
166. See id. at 1140 (stating factual distinction rendering cases cited by El Paso
inapplicable).
167. See id. (distinguishing facts of present case from cases involving mere
migration, decomposition or diffusion of pollutants from past point source
discharge).
168. See id. at 1141 (noting all cases cited by El Paso failed to address recur-
ring and ongoing sources of pollution).
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ing the plaintiffs' good-faith allegation. 169 Given that El Paso failed
to present the necessary evidence, the court correctly upheld
jurisdiction. 170
B. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Findings of
NPDES Violations
The Tenth Circuit correctly interpreted the scope of violations
under NPDES. 17' The court properly looked to legislative history,
common usage and other CWA provisions to interpret the phrase
"discharge of a pollutant" as stated under NPDES.1 72 The court ex-
amined the CWA's definition of "discharge," appropriately finding
it to mean "addition of any pollutant. ' 173 In defining "addition,"
the court correctly looked to the context of the CWA and adminis-
trative regulations promulgated by the EPA to provide interpreta-
tive support. 174 Though they are not substitutes for the plain
language of the CWA's general definitions provision, these sources
provided an abundance of persuasive guidance. 175 Furthermore,
when applying these regulations in the context of a Chevron analy-
sis, the court was correct to defer to the EPA's guidance.176 The
regulatory meanings construed by the EPA are permissible con-
structions of the statute and are thus entitled to controlling weight
under Chevron.1 77
The Tenth Circuit's ruling regarding the requirements for a
NPDES violation was also internally consistent with its prior rul-
169. See id. (noting El Paso's burden to demonstrate that pollutant discharge
was not continuous or intermittent).
170. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141 (explaining propriety of magistrate's ratio-
nale for asserting subject matter jurisdiction).
171. For a discussion of the statutory background of NPDES (33 U.S.C.
§ 1362), see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
172. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1143 (explaining need to look to secondary
sources due to lack of useful legislative history).
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" under
CWA).
174. See id. § 1311 (g) (2) (listing requirements for granting modifications to
effluent limitations for certain nonconventional pollutants); id. § 1318(a) (listing
requirements of owners or operators of any point source to establish and maintain
for inspection records, monitoring equipment and effluent samples); see also
Nonpoint Source Management Programs Grants Guidance, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,248
(Aug. 28, 1990) (stating drainage from abandoned mines can be point source pol-
lution where owner can be found; otherwise, it is nonpoint source pollution).
175. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144 (applying EPA regulations that provide in-
terpretative support).
176. For a discussion of the standards of statutory interpretation enunciated
in Chevron, see supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
177. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144 (explaining EPA interpretation of CWA
language).
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ings. 178 In previously holding that unintentional discharges of pol-
lutants from gold leaching operations violated the CWA, the court
noted the CWA's intention to broadly regulate the introduction of
pollutants into waterways. 179 Following its own prior rulings, which
found that point source owners can be liable for discharges
whether or not they acted intentionally in causing the discharge,
the Tenth Circuit correctly held that El Paso violated applicable
NPDES regulations.'80
C. Tenth Circuit's Examination of the Magistrate's Grant of
Summary Judgment Based on Evidence
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit correctly reversed the magis-
trate's grant of summary judgment based on the weight of the evi-
dence.' 81 Under the elements necessary for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court, in view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to El Paso, appropri-
ately found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
the hydrological connection in question.1 82 Though the experts
agreed that the Roosevelt Tunnel discharged some of the shaft's
water on an intermittent basis, the evidence conflicted with regard
to whether the shaft's pollutants were discharged at the portal. 183
Given that the evidence was not "so one-sided that [p]laintiffs
[were] entitled to prevail as a matter of law," the court properly
granted El Paso the opportunity to defend itself against the plain-
tiffs' claims through trial. 184
178. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979)
(holding unintentional discharge of pollutants from gold leaching operation vio-
lated CWA).
179. See id. (explaining CWA would be severely weakened if only intentional
acts were proscribed); El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1145-46 (noting Tenth Circuit's finding
of broad pollution regulation under CWA in Earth Sciences).
180. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1146 (noting significance of Tenth Circuit's pre-
cedent in Earth Sciences).
181. See id. at 1150 (holding reversal rests on application of proper standards
for summary judgment).
182. See id. at 1149-50 (noting plaintiffs' strongest expert evidence was less
than convincing given water sample data); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (explaining
when there is no genuine issue of material fact, moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as matter of law).
183. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1149 (noting evidence showed dramatic declines
in zinc levels as water flowed from El Paso Shaft toward Roosevelt Tunnel Portal).
184. See id. at 1150 (stating plaintiffs were not entitled to prevail as matter of
law).
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VI. IMPACT
Courts applying the Gwaltney standard to CWA citizen suits
have continuously struggled to understand its scope and applicabil-
ity.' 8 5 This task becomes even more challenging when courts at-
tempt to extend the Gwaltney standard to govern citizen suits under
the RCRA, CERCLA and EPCRA.18 6
Though the ultimate reversal of summary judgment rested on
an interpretation of federal procedural rules, the El Paso decision
affirmatively supports the ease with which citizen suits can be
filed.'1 7 Analysis within the court's opinion further suggests that
the Tenth Circuit supports the judicial minority by interpreting
Gwaltney and the CWA expansively. 188 This federal support for the
minority position will likely widen the split in circuit and district
court opinions, for three circuit courts of appeal already side with
the federal majority view (a narrow interpretation). 189
In addition to providing other courts with guidance on the de-
termination of subject matter jurisdiction, El Paso affirms the con-
clusion that the foundation of the CWA is point source ownership,
not discharge-causing conduct. 90 Even as prior cases established
that discharges from inactive mines can violate the CWA, the Tenth
Circuit expanded liability not just for owners of such mines, but for
successive landowners as well.' 9 ' After El Paso, both original and
successor owners of property with active and inactive mines will be
more vulnerable to the risk of liability for violating the CWA by fail-
ing to possess a valid NPDES permit.192
185. See Abate, supra note 19, at 27 (noting courts struggle to understand
scope and applicability of Gwaltney standard).
186. See id. (stating difficulty faced by courts in applying Gwaltney standard to
acts other than CWA).
187. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1141 (explaining good-faith allegation will stand
in absence of sufficient evidence to rebut presumption of violation),
188. See id. at 1139-41 (distinguishing instant case from those involving migra-
tion of pollutants from prior discharges). For a discussion of cases following an
expansive interpretation of Gwaltney, see supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of cases following a narrow interpretation of Gwaltney,
see supra note 92.
190. See El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144 (explaining significance of secondary evi-
dence showing that ownership of point source will trigger liability).
191. See id. (explaining lack of evidence to show that successor landowners
not currently mining their property are exempt from liability).
192. See id. at 1136 n.1 (citing Sierra Club's filing in 2000 of another CWA
citizen suit against Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining, Co. for discharges from
Carlton Tunnel, another drainage tunnel in Cripple Creek Mining District). For
the facts of Sierra Club's citizen suit against Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining,
Co., see Sierra Club, et al. v. Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining, Co., No. 00-cv-
02325-MSK-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27973 (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2006).
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As a result, potentially expensive fines and cleanup costs could
be imposed on landowners of abandoned mines regardless of the
particular owner's involvement-or lack thereof-in the creation
of potential mine discharges. 193 Environmental regulations such as
CERCLA already hold current landowners of property burdened
with toxic contaminants responsible for cleanup costs even when a
prior landowner created the contamination. 194 Expanding the
CWA's reach to successor owners of abandoned mines will likely
leave such owners responsible for the costs of cleaning up a pollu-
tion source they did not create, much like their counterparts under
CERCLA. 195 Present and future landowners, however, will immedi-
ately benefit from the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the CWA
and El Paso's clarification of the conditions under which a land-
owner is required to obtain an NPDES permit. 196
Michael P. Zanan
193. See Park, supra note 5, at 299 (explaining increases in toxic waste hazards
led to dramatic increase in governmental regulations requiring private parties to
clean up contaminants on their property).
194. See id. at 302 (noting CERCLA's influence on liability of owners of toxic
property).
195. See id. (explaining successor landowner responsibility under CERCLA for
hazardous waste site cleaning costs).
196. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (describing permit regulations under NPDES).
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